FCA enforcement cases illuminate critical elements of effective risk and compliance management. What makes these cases fascinating is the interplay between the business (first line of defence), the risk function (second line), internal audit (third line) and the Board - and crucially how the breach eventually came to light. A recent final notice against Nationwide Building Society resulting in a £44 million fine offers useful lessons for the financial services industry.
A recap of the events leading to this enforcement action:
Behind these headline facts lies a story of IT systems (and enhancements) that fail to deliver and internal company procedures that don’t seem to be delivering against expectations.
While the published final notice may not capture every nuance, five patterns emerge that should concern every risk professional.
A crucial insight: while the FCA sets high-level AML expectations, firms translate these into their own mandatory policies and procedures (for example, paragraph 4.32, 4.33 and 4.38). Regulators then treat failures to follow these internal policies as tantamount to regulatory breaches. In other words, your own procedures can become the stick you're beaten with.
Perhaps most troubling: the business accepted the risk of business use of personal accounts for approximately over two and a half years (paragraph 2.12 and 2.13). The final notice provides no evidence of risk function oversight or challenge of this decision – a striking gap in governance that allowed known issues to fester.
The supervisory timeline is not entirely clear. A 2015 supervisory review identified customer due diligence weaknesses (paragraph 4.13), which management accepted leading to several remediation activities (paragraph 4.14 and 4.17). But meaningful FCA intervention didn't occur until January 2020, triggered by ‘questions from the Authority’ (paragraph 4.40).
From June 2021 (when issues were addressed) to December 2024 (the final notice) represents approximately four and a half years of enforcement action – despite management’s cooperation. It is difficult to be precise about this; we count from the point at which the issues identified were addressed – June 2021, paragraph 4.44. This prolonged timeline itself carries implications for firms facing similar issues. This is a long time and given the nature of the issue would have taken management time and effort. One wonders if firms would prefer a quick resolution as a reward for management cooperation.
What should risk and compliance professionals take from this case? Here are five actionable lessons.
Create formal mechanisms for overseeing risk acceptance decisions, with mandatory periodic reviews and escalation triggers. "We'll launch a product to fix this" shouldn't be acceptable risk mitigation for 30 months (See paragraph 2.13 of the final notice).
Escalate key matters to the Board—and don't settle for passive acknowledgement. Ensure you're getting genuine engagement, challenge, and follow-through. Board papers should involve decision making or provide assurance, not just record problems.
Crowe helps financial services firms, including building societies, to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of risk management solutions, as well as the underlying frameworks. We have reviewed risk appetite, policy, embedding risk management roles and responsibilities, and more broadly help risk functions do more with less and operate in an environment where stakeholders’ expectations are increasing.
Insights