Note: This article is part of a series on risk areas that internal audit teams should consider for their risk assessment and planning for and throughout 2027. Industry-specific articles cover trends in these areas:
As financial services organizations prepare for 2027, internal audit teams must navigate a risk landscape shaped by rapid technological change, evolving credit conditions, regulatory expectations, and increasingly interconnected threats. AI adoption, AI-enabled identity fraud, cybersecurity governance, credit risk, and digital assets are creating new exposures while amplifying familiar risks across operations, compliance, third-party relationships, and customer protection.
The following areas should be prominent in 2027 audit planning as internal audit evaluates whether governance, controls, and risk-management practices are keeping pace with change.
By 2027, the risk for financial services organizations will be less about whether they are adopting AI and more about whether governance and controls have kept pace with adoption. The Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) June 2026 consultation proposes 12 sound practices spanning enterprise governance, life cycle risk management, information and communications technology resilience, cyber resilience, and third-party risk. At their core, the practices call for board and senior-management oversight, clear accountability, integration of AI into established risk frameworks, systematic materiality assessments, fit-for-purpose data, explainability, performance monitoring, human oversight, cybersecurity, and management of AI supply chain and concentration risk. The FSB practices provide a clear indication of the control environment supervisors might increasingly expect financial services organizations to demonstrate as AI becomes embedded in credit, fraud, compliance, trading, customer service, and operational processes.
For many organizations, the most significant exposure in 2027 might stem from the gap between AI governance policies and control execution. The FSB’s practices emphasize that responsible AI adoption requires more than a central policy or committee. Organizations need to maintain an inventory of AI use cases, classify and reassess risks, and define ownership across the three lines. They also need controls for model and system selection, data quality, and change management, along with ongoing testing, performance monitoring, and meaningful human oversight. Additional measures should address unapproved or changing third-party AI capabilities. The FSB also emphasizes proportionality and stronger controls as AI use cases become more material, complex, autonomous, or interconnected. Such controls are particularly important because generative and agentic AI can change functionality faster than traditional technology, potentially causing an organization’s risk profile to outpace its governance processes.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) provides a useful bridge from those emerging expectations to an organization’s existing internal control architecture. Its 2026 guidance, “Achieving Effective Internal Control Over Generative AI,” applies the internal control-integrated framework to AI rather than creating a separate governance construct. In practice, COSO embeds AI accountability, risk assessment, controls, reporting, and monitoring within the organization’s existing internal control framework. COSO specifically recognizes risks such as opaque reasoning, model drift, prompt manipulation, frequent configuration changes, and shadow AI to reinforce why traditional technology controls often need to be extended rather than reused unchanged.
Identity fraud likely will be a growing risk in the coming years. While AI might not create a new category of identity fraud, it could make existing schemes harder to detect and easier to execute at scale. Organizations will need a control environment that uses AI and machine learning to identify suspicious behavior across channels and payment types while improving workflow efficiency.
AI makes it much easier to build synthetic identities from a mix of real and fabricated data and to operate them at scale. Criminals can generate convincing identity documents, bank statements, pay stubs, employment records, and other supporting evidence and then pair them with synthetic selfies, deepfake videos, or cloned voices to make the person appear real. Automation enables criminals to create and test many identities at once, learn which controls they can pass, and reuse what works. Once accepted, an identity can be used to obtain credit, carry out bust-out fraud, receive scam proceeds, or move funds from account takeovers. Failed attempts are cheap, successful identities can be replicated, and the same campaign can target many organizations at once. The impact extends beyond fraud losses to customer friction, reputational harm, overloaded investigations, and reliance on external providers for identity verification, biometrics, and fraud monitoring.
Cyber risk has long been a significant concern for financial services organizations, and the growing adoption of AI adds to the challenge. As threats, technology, and third-party dependencies change, organizations must adapt their governance structures to maintain clear accountability and decision-making authority. The expanded use of cloud services, AI, digital channels, and third parties means that critical systems and data often span multiple teams and service providers. When cyber risks cross technology and operations functions and involve outside vendors, responsibility for managing those risks and making decisions can become unclear.
The Cyber Risk Institute (CRI) Profile provides a financial services-specific structure for assessing cyber risk, aligns evidence with regulatory expectations, and prioritizes remediation. Given the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC’s) retirement of the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool (CAT), organizations should evaluate whether their assessment approach supports meaningful risk decisions and reporting rather than simply replacing one compliance exercise with another.
Credit risk is shifting, and it represents another area of risk for financial services organizations. Interest rates have moved higher and might remain elevated, which increases refinancing pressure as earlier extensions and modifications mature. Higher replacement financing costs and softer collateral values are weakening repayment capacity and putting risk ratings and loss assumptions under greater pressure. Lending to nondepository financial institutions is also increasing. Such exposures can obscure underlying borrowers and collateral, heighten reliance on borrower-reported information, and connect banks to leveraged or interdependent counterparties.
These conditions create three related risks for financial organizations. From a business perspective, commercial real estate concentrations and stress in vulnerable sectors can accelerate risk-rating migration and reserve needs, which requires organizations to revisit assumptions based on prior rate and economic forecasts. From a regulatory perspective, supervisory attention to commercial real estate refinancing, private credit, and weaker-credit consumers increases the importance of controls that identify loan-level deficiencies before examinations. From an operational perspective, more extensions, modifications, and workouts can strain credit administration and special assets teams.
Community banks could have digital asset risk regardless of whether they offer related products or services. Risk and exposure can arise indirectly through customers that participate in digital asset markets, transfer funds to and from exchanges or wallet providers, hold digital assets as a source of wealth or repayment, or operate businesses connected to the sector. These relationships can create heightened deposit volatility, liquidity pressure, credit risk, fraud exposure, and financial crime risk as digital asset transactions might move rapidly, occur outside traditional banking hours, and be difficult to reverse or trace.
The speed, continuous operation, and evolving structure of digital asset markets can amplify risks already present in traditional banking. Large or concentrated transfers might cause abrupt changes in deposit balances while pseudonymous or layered transactions can obscure the source or purpose of funds. Asset-price volatility presents another risk of potentially weakening a borrower’s repayment capacity or reducing the value of digital assets associated with collateral or liquidity. Operational disruptions, cyber incidents, legal uncertainty, and reliance on specialized technology or service providers can further increase the potential for financial loss, customer harm, and reputational damage.
Digital assets also create governance and expertise risk because their legal, regulatory, accounting, compliance, and operational characteristics can differ significantly by asset and activity. Crypto assets, stablecoins, tokenized deposits, and tokenized securities might present different obligations and risk profiles, and a bank’s exposure might change faster than its policies, monitoring, and reporting practices. Limited internal knowledge can make it difficult to recognize emerging exposures, challenge assumptions, interpret regulatory expectations, or determine when activity has exceeded the bank’s risk appetite.
As financial services organizations prepare for 2027, internal audit teams should assess risks in the context of their broader organizational dependencies. Shared reliance on vendors, systems, models, data, and governance structures can allow weaknesses in one area to amplify risks elsewhere. Internal audit should evaluate these connections and assess management’s ability to identify, escalate, and respond to risks that cross organizational boundaries.
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